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RECENT BOOKS 
CONGRESS AND THE COURT. By Walter F. Murphy. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 1962. Pp. xi, 308. $6.95. 
Between March 18 and August 12 of 1958 the House of Representatives 
of the United States Congress enthusiastically approved five bills which, 
if enacted, would have been the most substantial restraint ever imposed 
by Congress on the United States Supreme Court.1 There is no doubt 
that dissatisfaction with the Court was at the time substantial in Congress 
and widespread throughout the country. Yet by August 24 of the same 
year the last of these bills had, in one way or another, been defeated. 
Here is a prime legislative mystery which is now convincingly resolved 
by Professor Walter F. Murphy in Congress and the Court. The author, 
associate professor of politics at Princeton, explores in fascinating detail 
the conflict between these two bodies that began in May 1954 and reached 
its climax in August 1958. The book is also much more than that, for 
this clash is merely the central, dramatic episode with which Professor 
Murphy compares other attacks upon the Court and thus illumines the 
continuing tensions that occasionally erupt into open conflict between 
Congress and the Court. Even where his review of earlier disputes re-
counts familiar events, such as the Judiciary Act of 1802, the Chase 
impeachment trial of 1804, -the Mccardle episode of the Reconstruction 
period, and the Court-packing plan of 1936-37, it is important to be 
thus reminded .that the crisis of the 1950's was not unique. Professor 
Murphy makes that history lively, and he often provides insights into 
those earlier periods that can be helpfully transferred t.o the present. 
It is useful to be reminded, for example, that words of condemnation 
scarcely exist in :the English language, from the sometimes elegant phrases 
of scl1olarly distaste, to the most scurrilous insults, that were not long ago 
used with reference to the Cour.t. Equally, it is interesting to learn how 
limited is human inventiveness in the political process. 
"By the close of Marshall's chief justiceship, almost all of the basic 
measures to curb the Court had been seriously suggested or actually 
tried: impeachment, reduction of jurisdiction, congressional review 
of decisions, limited tenure, requirement for an extraordinary majority 
to invalidate a statute, Court-packing, presidential refusal to enforce 
a decision, and (at the state level) nullification and even resort to 
force." (p. 63) 
1 H.R. 3, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) (to preclude federal pre-emption except where 
Congress expressed specific intent to supersede state law); S. 1411, 85th Cong., 2d Scss. 
(1958), as substantially amended in the House [to reverse the decision in Cole v. Young, 
351 U.S. 536 (1956)); H.R. 8361, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) (to restrict access of state 
prisoners to habeas corpus in federal court); H.R. 11477, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) 
[to restrict the ruling in Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957)); and H.R. 13272, 
85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) [to broaden the Smith Act definition of "organize," thus 
reversing in part Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957)). 
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In the light of that experience and the strong anti-Court passions often 
exhibited during these early years (including strikingly severe presidential 
criticism) , it is encouraging to be told that "no anti-Cour,t legislation 
passed Congress between the judiciary acts of 1802 and the Civil War. 
Furthermore, the Court's prestige grew and flourished in the environment 
of conflict, and that prestige remained at a high level until 1857." (p. 63) 
Indeed, it would not be inaccurate to say that the only other occasion on 
which Congress has ever succeeded absolutely in curbing the Court was in 
the 1868 legislation restricting the jurisdiction of the Court to review 
certain writs of habeas corpus, which was sustained in Ex parte McGardle.2 
At the same time it is true that the attack mounted in ,the mid-
fifties was in some ways more substantial than anything that had gone 
before. Unlike ,the proposals of President Roosevelt in 1936, in which many 
saw nothing but a cynical attempt to pack the Court in order to save 
an already floundering political program, the complaints of the 1950's 
came from a variety of sources which in combination seemed at times 
to include every respectable element of society. The coalition of forces 
may have been peculiarly unstable because of the various, and sometimes 
contrary, motivation of its supporters; but strong it seemed for a time to be. 
In the years immediately before 1954 the critics of the Court, then 
chiefly liberals, had proved largely impotent to effect change to their 
liking. However, the former critics and supporters reversed positions 
shortly after Earl Warren became Chief Justice in the Fall of 1953, 
specifically wi,th the decision in Brown v. Board of Education.3 Segrega-
tionists were soon joined in condemnation of the Court by other 
states' righters who were not primarily segregation-minded, by those who 
reacted in the name of national security, and by those who feared a 
breakdown in law enforcement at all levels. By August of 1958 a number 
of state legislatures had voted defiant (and futile) resolutions of inter-
position; the association of state attorneys general had expressed alarm; 
the state chief justices had called for "self-restraint"; an American Bar 
Association committee had specifically disapproved some twenty-four 
decisions of the Court; and some scholars were beginning to complain 
about "unreasoned" decisions even when they reached a "right" result. If 
crisis of confidence there ever was, this was it. Yet, surprisingly, the rising 
2 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). For this purpose I do not count the four constitutional 
amendments which were adopted, not so much to overturn Court decisions as to alter 
provisions of the Constitution found defective. This is true of the eleventh, fourteenth, 
sixteenth, and nineteenth amendments. Similarly, I would agree with Professor Murphy 
(p. 262 n.) that it is not appropriate for this purpose to include such legislation as 
that requiring three-judge courts to enjoin enforcement of certain legislative or admin-
istrative acts. As he points out (p. 262 n.) the Norris-LaGuardia Act could be classed 
as an attack on the Court, but involved other issues as well. 
3 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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crescendo of criticism never came to anything very much. True, the so-
called Jencks bill had been enacted in 1957 in reaction to Jencks v. United 
States;4 but the statute has been described with considerable justification 
as simply a codification, although somewhat modified, of the Court's 
ruling; and most supporters of the bill disclaimed any intent to rebuke the 
Court.5 The important thing is that none of the proposals designed to 
restrict the Court's jurisdiction or its freedom of decision was finally 
enacted. The reasons for this failure were at the time by no means clear. 
Professor Murphy has remarkably illuminated the events of that period 
to demonstrate what factors were most important in the defeat of the 
anti-Court proposals. 
It is an amazing story, made especially authoritative by the fact that 
Professor Murphy relied not only on the legislative record, but as well 
did extensive interviewing and on-the-spot research. The author shows, 
for example, that the anti-Court leadership at one time had sufficient 
strength to pass S. 654 (designed to reverse the pre-emption point in 
Pennsylvania v. Nelson) ,6 but overreached themselves in seeking enactment 
instead of H.R. 3 (denying all pre-emption except with specific con-
gressional approval). (pp. 217-18) Some legislation actually passed the 
Senate as well as ·the House, but the conference reports failed to receive 
the necessary majority votes thereafter in both Houses. (pp. 218-23) 
The study is valuable also for the picture provided of the role of 
special-interest groups and of individuals. Among the individuals, Lyndon 
Johnson, then Majority Leader of the Senate, was unquestionably the most 
important. Murphy describes him thus: 
"In a sense, Lyndon Johnson's role in the battle over the Warren 
Court was unique. Johnson fully understood the ethic of the Senate. 
He knew how to advise without becoming patronizing; how to 
warn without seeming boorish; how to bargain without appearing 
to bribe or promising more than he could deliver; how to appeal to 
personal honor, party unity, Senate loyalty, or national welfare 
without becoming unctuous. Moreover, Johnson knew where each of 
4 353 U.S. 657 (1957). 
5 In 1959, after the high point of the crisis, Congress filled in the jurisdictional "no• 
man's-land" found by the Court in Guss v. Utah, 353 U.S. 1 (1957). NLRA § 14(c), added 
by 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 164 (c) (Supp. III, 1962). In the same year Congress 
modified state power to tax the net income of interstate businesses approved by the 
Court in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959). 
Act of Sept. 14, 1959, 73 Stat. 555. But these issues were scarcely the ones that had 
agitated Congress in the critical years. 
On June 19, 1962, President Kennedy signed P.L. 87-486, amending § 2385 of title 18 
of the United States Code to define the word "organize" in the Smith Act "to include 
the recruiting of new members, the forming of new units, and the regrouping or expan-
sion of existing clubs, classes, and other units of such society, group, or assembly of 
persons." H.R. 3247, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1962). The effect of this is to reverse in part 
the decision in Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). 
6 350 U.S. 497 (1956). 
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his colleagues in both parties stood--or wavered-and what each 
wanted or feared. At the same time, he cleverly camouflaged his 
own position; few people knew what Johnson really wanted, other 
than to come out on the winning side. Perhaps most important, his 
tactical genius and marvelous ability to dissemble were geared to 
a restless energy and a burning personal ambition. There were many 
factors which played a part in the defeat of the anti-Court bills; 
but without Johnson's leadership, even though it was only warily 
accepted by ,the more ardent of •the Court defenders, more legislation 
would certainly have been passed and much of it signed into law." 
(p. 249) 
Professor Murphy convincingly demonstrates t,hat the anti-Court 
faction in Congress was not able, a£ter 1958, to mount another full-scale 
legislative attack against the Court in succeeding sessions of Congress. 
Despite the impetus that might have been provided by the sharply critical 
report of the Conference of Chief Justices in August 1958, and the more 
temperate, but still critical, recommendations from the American Bar 
Association in February 1959, the momentum of the attack was gone, aided 
no doubt by the fact that several leading senatorial critics of the Cou11t 
did not return to Congress in 1959. 
Professor Murphy suggests ·that these leadership losses, in combination 
with the 1958 election results which were generally viewed as favorable to 
the liberal viewpoint, were enough to preclude the possibility of any sub-
stantial attack on the Court, at least in 1959 or 1960. With ·that I agree; 
but he goes further to assert, somewhat gratuitously in my judgment, that 
the Court blunted the aHack by a retreat from the criticized decisions. 
I recognize that his view is widely accepted as orthodox, but I wonder if 
the evidence justifies that rather serious reflection on judicial integrity. 
He relies for this conclusion on several decisions of the 1958 Term in 
which he finds withdrawal from earlier positions, and he suggests that 
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan "were primarily responsible for the 
Warren Court's shift in direction." (p. 265) If I may say, that is an 
unlikely pair to find responding to congressional criticism. Even as Mr. 
Justice Frankfurter has himself sought to clear Mr. Justice Roberts of 
the charge that he was in 1937 a party to the alleged "switch in .time to 
save nine,"7 I would strongly urge that ,the votes of Frankfurter in 1958-59, 
as always, represented his own convictions, unaffected by fear of con-
gressional retribution. Generalizing further, as I ,think one may, it seems 
unlikely that any member of the Court during those years was amenable 
to such influence. We need scarcely be reminded that these are strong-
minded men whose judicially expressed views are but the outward 
manifestation of deeply held convictions. 
In more specific answer, however, fur.ther notice should be given the 
7 Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 311 (1955). 
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1958 Term. Professor Murphy makes much (as do other commentators) 
of the Court's "withdrawal" from Watkins and Sweezy8 in Barenblatt 
and Uphaus.9 While it is true that contempt citations for refusal to 
answer questions posed by legislative bodies were set aside in the earlier 
cases and upheld in the latter, it should also be noted that the cases were 
distinguishable on their facts. Indeed, Mr. Justice Harlan in Barenblatt 
specifically reaffirmed the principle of Watkins and Sweezy; and when 
a comparable fact situation again came before the Court, in Deutsch v. 
United States,10 the Court applied the Watkins principle to upset the 
conviction. Moreover, during the 1958 Term itself the Court unanimously 
upset contempt convictions arising out of other congressional11 and state 
legislative12 investigations. Scarcely the work of an intimidated Court that 
knows well the art of avoiding decision where the decision is likely to be 
unpalatable. 
Nor can much be made of other "retreats" in the 1958 Term. It was 
after all the year of Cooper v. Aaron,13 perhaps the most ringing of all the 
Court's denunciations of segregation. It was also the year of Greene v. 
McElroy14 which occasioned the recasting of the entire government 
employee security program when the Court denied that Congress had 
authorized security discharges without confrontation. It was also the 
year of Irvin v. Dowd,15 controversial in the extreme on the sensitive 
points of habeas corpus and the right of state courts to make decisions 
in criminal cases on grounds immune from federal court review.16 Not 
a bad record of liberalism for a Court described as in "retreat" from 
conservative attacks. 
Robert B. McKay, 
Professor of Law, 
New York University 
s Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 
234 (1957). 
9 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 
72 (1959). 
10 367 U.S. 456 (1961). 
11 Flaxer v. United States, 358 U.S. 147 (1958). 
12 Scull v. Virginia, 359 U.S. 344 (1959). See also Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959). 
13 358 U.S. l (1958). 
14 360 U.S. 474 (1959). See also Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959). 
15 359 U.S. 394 (1959). 
16 See also Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of New York, 360 U.S. 684 
(1959) (denial of license for showing of "Lady Chatterley's Lover" invalid on stated 
grounds); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (continuous questioning without 
opportunity to consult counsel violates due process); NAACP v. Alabama, 360 U.S. 240 
(1959) (contempt citation of NAACP for failure to produce documents upset for second 
time); Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S. 633 (1959) (absence of counsel denial of due process in 
circumstances). 
